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Abstract
Wittgenstein did not write very much on the topic of probability.
The little we have comes from a few short pages of the Tractatus,
some ‘remarks’ from the 1930’s, and the informal conversations which
went on during that decade with the Vienna Circle. Nevertheless,
Wittgenstein’s views were highly influential in the later development
of the logical theory of probability. This paper will attempt to clarify
and defend Wittgenstein’s conception of probability against some oft-
cited criticisms that stem from a misunderstanding of his views. Max
Black, for instance, criticises Wittgenstein for formulating a theory of
probability that is capable of being used only against the backdrop of
the ideal language of the Tractatus. I argue that on the contrary, by
appealing to the ‘hypothetical laws of nature’, Wittgenstein is able to
make sense of probability statements involving propositions that have
not been completely analysed. G.H. von Wright criticises Wittgen-
stein’s characterisation of these very hypothetical laws. He argues that
by introducing them Wittgenstein makes what is distinctive about his
theory superfluous, for the hypothetical laws are directly inspired by
statistical observations and hence these observations indirectly deter-
mine the mechanism by which the logical theory of probability oper-
ates. I argue that this is not the case at all, and that while statistical
observations play a part in the formation of the hypothetical laws,
these observations are only necessary, but not sufficient conditions for
the introduction of these hypotheses.
Wittgenstein a peu e´crit au sujet de la probabilite´. Le peu que
nous avons vient de quelques pages du Tractatus, de quelques remar-
ques des anne´es 1930 et de conversations de la de´cennie lorsqu’il e´tait
actif dans le Cercle de Vienne. Ne´anmoins, l’oeuvre de Wittgenstein a
beaucoup contribue´ au de´veloppement de la the´orie logique des prob-
abilite´s. Cet article tente de clarifier et de de´fendre la conception
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de Wittgenstein de la probabilite´ contre certaines critiques souvent
cite´es qui de´coulent d’une me´compre´hension de sa contribution. Max
Black, par example, e´crit que la the´orie des probabilite´s, telle que
Wittgenstein l’a formule´e, n’est susceptible d’eˆtre utilise´e que dans le
contexte de la langue ide´ale du Tractatus. Je tiens qu’en faisant appel
aux lois de la nature hypothe´tique, Wittgenstein est en mesure de faire
sens d’e´nonce´s de probabilite´ qui n’ont pas e´te´ comple`tement analyse´s.
G.H. von Wright critique la caracte´risation de Wittgenstein de ces
meˆmes lois hypothe´tiques. Il e´crit qu’en introduisant de telles lois
Wittgenstein rend le trait distinctif de sa the´orie superflu, car les lois
hypothe´tiques sont directement inspire´es par les observations statis-
tiques et donc de´terminent indirectement le me´canisme par lequel la
the´orie logique des probabilite´s fonctionne. Je tiens que ce n’est pas
du tout le cas; tandis que les observations statistiques jouent un roˆle
dans la formation des lois hypothe´tiques, ces observations ne sont que
des conditions ne´cessaires, et pas suffisantes, pour l’introduction de
ces hypothe`ses.
1 Introduction
Wittgenstein did not write very much on the topic of probability. The little
we have comes from a few short pages of the Tractatus, some ‘remarks’ from
the 1930’s, and the informal conversations which went on during that decade
with the Vienna Circle. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein’s views were highly influ-
ential; he heavily influenced Waismann’s and Carnap’s logical interpretations
of probability, and through them, ultimately, modern Bayesianism.
This paper will attempt to clarify Wittgenstein’s conception of probabil-
ity and defend it against two common objections that, I will argue, stem from
a misunderstanding of his position and not from any actual faults that can
be attributed to it. The first of these objections, due to Max Black, criticises
Wittgenstein for formulating a theory of probability that is only capable of
being used against the backdrop of the ideal, completely analysable, language
of the Tractatus. I will argue, against Black, that by way of his notion of the
hypothetical laws of nature, Wittgenstein is able to make sense of probability
statements involving propositions that have not been completely analysed.
The second objection, given by G.H. von Wright, criticises Wittgenstein’s
characterisation of these very hypothetical laws. Von Wright argues that by
introducing them Wittgenstein makes his own logical theory of probability
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superfluous, for the hypothetical laws are directly inspired by statistical ob-
servations and hence these observations indirectly determine the mechanism
by which the logical theory of probability operates. I will argue that this
is not the case at all, and that while statistical observations play a part in
the formation of the hypothetical laws, these observations are only necessary,
but not sufficient conditions for the introduction of these hypotheses.
2 The Classical and Frequentist Interpreta-
tions of Probability
The so-called ‘probability calculus’ consists of a number of axioms, defini-
tions, and theorems derived from them from which one can formulate rules
for computing complex probabilities from prior probabilities. The calculus
provides us, for instance, with the addition rule for the probability of oc-
currence of A or B, when we already know the probability of the individual
events A and B:
(∀AB)[P (A ∪ B) = P (A) + P (B)] (where A ∩ B = ∅)
But the probability calculus says nothing about how the prior probabilities
themselves (i.e., how ‘P (A)’ and ‘P (B)’, above) should be determined. In
other words, the question of the meaning of primitive probability statements
is left open. It is precisely with this question of the meaning of prior probabil-
ity statements that the various ‘interpretations’ of probability are concerned.
What we now call the classical interpretation of probability was formu-
lated by Pierre Simon Laplace in the early part of the 19th century. The basic
principle behind Laplace’s theory is the ‘Principle of Insufficient Reason’,1
according to which one must consider two outcomes as equally possible if one
has no reason to prefer one outcome over the other. For example, consider
a six-sided die. Assuming the die is not biased, I cannot say that rolling a
3 is any more likely than rolling another number, for as far as I can tell, all
of these outcomes are equally possible. But now once we have divided the
possible outcomes of an event into a number of equally possible cases, the
probability of a particular outcome becomes a simple ratio: of the cases that
are ‘favourable’ to an outcome, to the total possible cases (Laplace, 1825, p.
7). Thus if I want to calculate the probability of rolling a 2, the number of
1This is sometimes called the ‘Principle of Indifference’.
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cases favourable to this outcome is one. If, on the other hand, I would like
to calculate the probability of rolling an even number, the number of cases
favourable to this outcome is three (i.e., 2, 4, and 6). To get the probability,
I divide the cases favourable to the outcome by the total number of possible
cases. The probability of rolling a 2, therefore, is 1/6, and the probability of
rolling an even number is 3/6 = 1/2.
The classical interpretation was the dominant interpretation of probabil-
ity for many decades, and it accords very well with our intuitions concerning
games of chance (e.g., craps, roulette wheels, lotteries, etc.). However ap-
plying it more generally, as we will see shortly, proves to be problematic.
Thus by the mid-19th century, an alternative interpretation began to emerge,
largely through the work of Leslie Ellis and John Venn. This came to be
called the frequency interpretation, and its first rigorous formulation was
given by Richard von Mises early in the 20th century.
To understand the motivation behind the frequency interpretation, con-
sider the case of a biased die. For Laplace, statements of probability must be
defined with respect to equally probable cases. But suppose I shift the centre
of gravity of this die, or file away one of its corners. If I do this, then it will
no longer be the case that each outcome is equally possible. But regardless,
we would still like to say that there is some specific probability of throwing
an even number with this die. On the classical conception, however, this
probability appears to be impossible to calculate.
A more telling example has to do with the probability of death (e.g., as
used by insurance companies). Suppose we say that the probability of death
for a forty year-old non-smoking male is 0.011. It is not clear at all how
the classical interpretation can conceive of a case like this one. Von Mises
asks: “Are there 1000 different probabilities, eleven of which are ‘favourable’
to the occurrence of death, or are there 3000 possibilities and thirty-three
‘favourable’ ones? It would be useless to search the textbooks for an answer,
for no discussion on how to define equally likely cases in questions of this
kind are given” (von Mises, 1957 [1928], pp. 69-70).
Probability gets defined, for von Mises, as the relative frequency of an
outcome with respect to a sequence of repeatable events. For example, given
a sequence of 1000 rolls of a single die, we might observe that 6 turns up
300 times. We can then say that the relative frequency of 6 in this sequence
is 300/1000 = 0.3. The longer the sequence, the more closely the observed
relative frequency approaches the true probability of rolling a 6 (which is
considered to be a ‘physical’ attribute of the sequence). The probability,
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then, of getting a 6 with this die, is a kind of idealisation: it is defined as
the limiting value of the relative frequency of 6 with respect to an infinite
sequence of rolls. To illustrate how this works: suppose that after each roll
of the die I calculate the relative frequency of 6, rounding off to the first
decimal place. I eventually find, after n rolls, that the relative frequency
ceases to change; it remains constant at, say, 0.3. At this point, I increase
the number of decimal places to two. The value begins to fluctuate again,
but after m more rolls, it again ceases to change; it stays constant at, say .32.
I then increase the precision to three places. Again, the relative frequency
eventually stabilises; this time at .324. If I continue the process infinitely, the
relative frequency will be accurate to an infinite number of decimal points
(von Mises, 1957 [1928], pp. 14-15).
One problem with von Mises’ version of frequentism is that it involves
an inference from actually observed sequences of events, which are finite, to
infinite sequences of those same events. This was enough for Wittgenstein
to reject the frequentist interpretation of von Mises, for as he pointed out, it
is possible to infer infinitely many infinite sequences from a finite sequence
(which we take as the infinite sequence’s initial segment).
If we infer from the relative frequency of an event its relative
frequency in the future, we can of course only do that from the
frequency which has in fact been so far observed. And not from
one we have derived from observation by some process or other for
calculating probabilities. For the probability we calculate is com-
patible with any frequency whatever that we actually observe,
since it leaves the time open (Wittgenstein, 1975, §234).
For example, consider a physical process described by a function that
maps to 0 for values of x less than n (where n is some very large value), but
maps to 2x for values of x greater than or equal to n. If we consider only
an initial segment of the sequence, we will be led to infer, using the limiting
value of the relative frequency as our guide, that the probability of f(x)
resulting in 0 is 1. If n is so large that it is humanly impossible for anyone to
observe n actual instances of this process, then there is no way to infer the
true relative frequency of 0 with respect to the process. Further, infinitely
many hypotheses about f are compatible with the relative frequency that
we observe. We might hypothesize, for instance, that (∀x ≥ n)f(x) = 3x,
or that (∀x ≥ n)f(x) = 4x, or that (∀x ≥ n)f(x) = 323467x or even that
(n ≤ ∀x < 2n)f(x) = 3x & (∀x ≥ 2n)f(x) = 30x.
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3 Wittgenstein’s Logical Interpretation
The main sources for Wittgenstein’s views on probability are propositions 5.1
- 5.156 of the Tractatus (his early period), and also §§225 - 237 of the Philo-
sophical Remarks (his middle period). Like Laplace, for Wittgenstein the
probability of a proposition depends on our knowledge situation at the time
the statement is made. However, for Wittgenstein, probability represents a
relation, not between events, but propositions: between the propositions rep-
resentative of our knowledge situation and the propositions for which we are
seeking to fix a probability value to. It is easiest to understand Wittgenstein’s
interpretation if we consider a truth table. For example:
A B C P : (∼ A ⊃ (B ∨ C)) Q : (∼ B)
1 T T T T F
2 T T F T F
3 T F T T T
4 T F F T T
5 F T T T F
6 F T F T F
7 F F T T T
8 F F F F T
Consider the proposition P. We can view it as a truth function, and like
any other function, it accepts a number of arguments as input (here given
in the first three columns) and produces a determinate output. Now call
the truth grounds of a proposition the truth values of its truth arguments
which make it true (5.101).2 The rows on which P is true are the rows 1-7.
Therefore the set of its truth grounds is: { {T, T, T}, {T, T, F}, {T, F, T},
{T, F, F}, {F, T, T}, {F, T, F}, {F, F, T} }. Similarly, the truth grounds of
Q are on lines 3-4,7-8: { {T, F, T}, {T, F, F}, {F, F, T}, {F, F, F} }.3 Now
if we compare the truth grounds of these two propositions, we find that the
truth grounds of Q and P overlap. But we can ask the question, ‘given P,
when is Q true?’ P is true on lines 1-7 for a total of seven instances. In the
context of these seven lines, Q is true three times (on lines 3, 4, and 7). So
2Here, and in the sequel, references to the Tractatus will simply note the proposition
number.
3Strictly speaking, Q, takes only one argument. Since the truth-values of A and C are
irrelevant, however, including them has no effect.
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we can say that Q is true 3/7 of the time whenever P is true; i.e., we can
calculate the conditional probability: P (Q|P) = 3/7.
In general, we can say that: “If Tr is the number of the truth-grounds of a
proposition ‘r’, and if Trs is the number of the truth-grounds of a proposition
‘s’ that are at the same time truth-grounds of ‘r’, then we call the ratio Trs :
Tr the degree of probability that the proposition ‘r’ gives to the proposition
‘s’ ” (5.15). When two propositions have no truth arguments in common,
the probability of one given the other is simply 1/2. For example, A, B, and
C above have no truth arguments in common, and we can see from the truth
table that P (A|B) = P (B|A) = P (A|C) = P (C|A) = P (B|C) = P (C|B) =
0.5.
The truth-grounds of a proposition can be said to define a proposition’s
range.4 Wittgenstein writes, “The truth-conditions of a proposition deter-
mine the range that it leaves open to the facts. ... ” (4.463). Consider the
truth table above once again, and imagine that the totality of our knowledge
consists of the elementary propositions A, B, and C. We can say, then, that
each line of the truth table represents a possible state description of the uni-
verse. For example, line 6 represents a possible state of the universe such
that (∼ A&B& ∼ C). We can now define the range of the proposition Q as
the state descriptions that are compatible with it. Further, we can say that
Q is logically equivalent to the disjunction of the state descriptions making
up its range, i.e.: (A& ∼ B&C) ∨ (A& ∼ B& ∼ C) ∨ (∼ A& ∼ B&C) ∨ (∼
A& ∼ B& ∼ C)
Now for the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, all non-elementary proposi-
tions are logically analysable in principle into truth-functions of elementary
propositions. Thus if we could perform such a complete analysis, then we
could compute the probability of some proposition of unknown truth value
simply by comparing its range with the total number of state descriptions
that are left open by the other propositions which make up our knowledge
situation. Thus imagine, for instance, that we know independently that the
state description described by line 1 can be ruled out. Then in the case where
we do not know the truth value of P, we can say that its probability given
our knowledge situation is 6/7: it is true six out of seven times (i.e., true on
4The German word is Spielraum. The notion of the Spielraum of an hypothesis dates
to the 19th century and is first found in von Kries’ work on probability. Whether or
not Wittgenstein was actually acquainted with von Kries’ work is debatable; however his
notion of a Spielraum is similar to von Kries’ notion in its essentials. See Heidelberger
(2001) for a discussion.
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lines 2-7 but false on line 8).
Now while Black sees this as the chief virtue of Wittgenstein’s account,
he considers it to be at the same time its chief defect, for while it may be
possible to completely analyse the propositions of the idealised language of
the Tractatus, we know of no way of doing this for real languages. Thus,
he writes: “Ironically, its one claim to novelty ensures its lack of relevance
to concrete examples. ... we have no way of analysing the propositions of
ordinary life or of science, and so no way of calculating the degree of proba-
bility between propositions. ... ‘complete analysis’ is a metaphysical mirage,
whose hypothetical existence leaves the problem of handling the propositions
with which we are acquainted, in all their remoteness from the canons of an
‘ideal language’, stubbornly insoluble” (Black, 1966, p. 256).
But note, first, that Wittgenstein is not concerned with giving us a practi-
cal method for actually calculating prior probabilities, but rather with giving
us a theory of the meaning of probability statements. Thus if we were to
perform a complete analysis of the propositions of our language, any prob-
ability that we calculated in that case would be taken as representing the
‘true’ probability of the proposition in question. In our everyday scientific
practice, then, when we make a probability statement, what we mean to say
is that the result of the above procedure of complete analysis would agree
with the probability that we have asserted. But it is not to say that we actu-
ally attempt to perform such a procedure, for second, and more importantly,
with respect to the ‘everyday’ calculation of probabilities, Wittgenstein does
not require the sort of analysis that Black envisions at all.
In this regard, it will be instructive if we turn to one of Wittgenstein’s
own examples. If I place an equal number of white and black balls into
an urn and then ask “what is the probability of drawing a white ball from
this urn?”, the answer will invariably be 1/2. Why? Wittgenstein’s answer
is the following “... if I say, ‘The probability of my drawing a white ball
is equal to the probability of my drawing a black one’, this means that all
the circumstances that I know of (including the laws of nature assumed as
hypotheses) give no more probability to the occurrence of the one event than
to that of the other. ...” (5.154).
The key phrase here, ironically, is the one in parentheses. It is important
to understand what Wittgenstein means by these laws of nature assumed as
hypotheses.5 Thus imagine the set of all (not necessarily elementary) propo-
5In my interpretation of this passage I am indebted to von Wright (1969). However, as
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sitions whose truth value is known. Call this set the bulk of our knowledge,
K . Now, for Wittgenstein, the proposition (P ⊃ (Q∨R)) can belong to K
even though neither P nor Q nor R belong to K . This may seem strange at
first, but that this is possible follows from Wittgenstein’s views on quantifica-
tion. For Wittgenstein, quantified sentences are to be thought of as schemas
or prototypes for constructing propositions. Note that he held this view both
in the Tractatus as well as later. Thus in the Tractatus, he writes: “What
is peculiar to the generality-sign is first, that it indicates a logical prototype
...” (5.522); In the Philosophical Remarks, he writes: “An hypothesis is a
law for forming propositions” (Wittgenstein, 1975, §228).
For example, the proposition: ‘If Socrates is a man, then Socrates is
mortal’ is an instance of the rule specified by the hypothesis: ‘All men are
mortal’. The latter is a schema for constructing propositions such as the
former. Thus if we accept a certain law of nature, e.g., (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Bx),
then all propositions capable of being constructed from it, e.g.: (Aa ⊃ Ba),
(Ab ⊃ Bb), (Ac ⊃ Bc), ..., will belong to K ; and this will be the case even if
the truth-values of Aa, Ab, Ac, Ba, Bb, Bc, ... are unknown.
Thus it is possible to have knowledge of a non-elementary proposition
without having knowledge of its constituents; for the knowledge of such
propositions is derived from our general laws and not built up from elemen-
tary propositions. The hypothetical general laws provide a means to add
propositions expressing relations between propositions (elementary or not)
to K without actually adding knowledge of these propositions themselves
to K . But if we can ‘know’ a proposition without knowing the truth or
falsity of its constituents, then we can compute probabilities based on these
unanalysed propositions as well. This is Wittgenstein’s meaning when he
writes: “We use probability only in default of certainty—if our knowledge of
a fact is not indeed complete, but we do know something about its form. ...”
(5.156, emphasis mine).
Coming back to the urn example, say that it is a ‘law of nature’ that
‘for all urns containing an equal number of white and black balls, all balls
drawn will be either white or a black’ (where ‘or’ is, of course, taken in the
exclusive sense), or symbolically: (∀x∈U)(Wx⊕Bx). This implies that for this
particular draw, that (Wa ⊕ Ba). Now consider the proposition expressing
the fact that I draw a white ball, (Wa). The probability conferred on this
I explain below, I disagree with von Wright’s negative evaluation of Wittgenstein’s views
on the probability of hypotheses.
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proposition by (Wa ⊕ Ba) is 1/2 (all else being equal). Note that we have
calculated this probability in spite of the fact that we do not know either Wa
or Ba.
But was it not through an analysis of the proposition (Wa ⊕Ba) that we
inferred the probability of Wa? Thus even if we do not know the truth or
falsity of Wa or Ba, we still need to know what the constituents of (Wa⊕Ba)
are in order to determine a probability for Wa, do we not? Yes, however, it
need not be a complete analysis, forWa need not be elementary. Wa may itself
be a complex proposition, representing a conjunction, perhaps, of further
elementary propositions. The laws of nature (which are simply assumed, a
priori), tell us something about the relationships between propositions, and in
describing these relationships, they of course must describe the constituents
of these relationships—but these need not be described in every detail for we
do not need to know what the constituents of these constituents are; these
constituents can represent ‘abstractions’, in a sense. Thus, these laws of
nature express relationships between (possibly complex) propositions. These
laws constitute the framework by which we describe the world (6.342); they
form the a priori assumptions that we hold in the background when we make
any statement of probability. Of course, as our knowledge grows, we may
learn more about the constituents of these propositions, and this will, in turn,
affect our calculated probabilities. Thus assume that K consists of the single
proposition, (P ⊃ (Q ∨R)). Given that I know this proposition, but not P ,
Q, or R, the probability that this proposition confers on the proposition R is
4/7. Now assume that as our knowledge grows we eventually add Q to K .
In this new situation, the probability of R becomes 1/2. And if, one day, we
discover that Q is capable of further analysis, and we come to know the truth
or falsity of one of its constituents, say, q1, this will affect the probability of
R even further.
4 The Inspiration of Hypotheses
Recall that Wittgenstein was critical of the frequentist interpretation of prob-
ability. As we discussed above, for Wittgenstein, observed relative frequencies
can have no direct bearing on the calculation of probabilities. By themselves,
they show nothing, for, as he was wont to say, they ‘leave the time open’.
Relative frequencies can have a role to play with regard to probabilities, how-
ever, in an indirect way; i.e., they can inspire us to formulate new, or revise
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our old, hypothetical laws of nature, or even to postulate that there is some
unknown law of nature responsible for an observed phenomenon. Whether
or not we do this depends on the cost to us: “The probability of an hypoth-
esis has its measure in how much evidence is needed to make it profitable
to throw it out. It’s only in this sense that we can say that repeated uni-
form experience in the past renders the continuation of this uniformity in the
future probable” (Wittgenstein, 1975, §229).
Now for von Wright, the fact that observed frequencies can ‘inspire’ new
hypotheses in this way makes Wittgenstein’s logical definition of probabil-
ity (i.e., the definition in terms of the measures of ranges or truth grounds)
“superfluous as a method for computing probability-values. ... The licensed
appeal to “unknown circumstances”, i.e. to the operations of unknown laws
... knocks the bottom out of the original definition. ... It does not perform
the function or roˆle of feeding the calculus with actual values of probabilities.
There is no need for this mediating roˆle of a definition of probability. Statis-
tical experiences “inspire” directly hypothetical assignments of probabilities”
(von Wright, 1969, pp. 275-276).
Von Wright overestimates the role that observed relative frequencies have,
for Wittgenstein, in ‘inspiring’ hypotheses, and I think that it is simply
incorrect to say that they directly inspire hypothetical laws of nature. In one
of his conversations with the Vienna Circle in the early thirties, Wittgenstein
makes the observation that “If the relative frequency deviates systematically
from the probability that was calculated, we as it were lay down the postulate
that there must be further causes to be found ... The other circumstances
that we introduce must not have the character of assumptions contrived ad
hoc” (McGuinness, 1979, p. 95).
Von Wright makes it appear as though observations of relative frequency
alone are enough to prompt a Wittgenstinian to postulate arbitrary unknown
laws of nature in order to explain them. But surely there is more to it than
this. Take the case of a die (Wittgenstein’s example). Imagine that the
relative frequency of 1 for a long series of trials converges to 1. We might
hypothesise that this die is loaded; if so, we will not stop there, but we
will crack it open and inspect it. We will search for a cause—perhaps a
shifted centre of gravity, perhaps faulty manufacturing processes or shoddy
materials. We will not be satisfied, and will not be willing to accept it as a
law of nature that the die can give nothing but ones, until we have somehow
connected this fact with our physical theories of the world.
If it turns out, miraculously, that there is no reason that we can give—even
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after all of our best scientists and theoreticians have investigated this pecu-
liar phenomenon—why this die gives rise to such a frequency of ones, the
scientific community will be in crisis. A photograph of the die will be on
the front page of every magazine and of every newspaper; millions of dollars
will be offered to the first who can come up with a successful explanation of
this phenomenon—all because we will refuse to simply hypothesise, without
sufficient reason, that there is some special but unknown law of nature such
that this particular die can give nothing but ones.
And even in the case where we throw up our hands and say that there is
some unknown law of nature at work, we will still attempt to constrain the
unknown law in such a way that, whatever it is, it accords with our other
hypothetical laws of nature; we will say that it must be a law of such and
such a kind, or that the general characteristics of its operation must be by
way of such and such a mechanism. But we will not simply say that it is a law
of nature that this die gives nothing but ones without further ado. In short,
relative frequencies alone do not inspire hypothetical laws of nature; they do
so only when they can be reconciled with our network of already established
hypotheses.
In actual fact, he will refuse to accept it as a natural law that he
can throw nothing but ones. At least, it will have to go on for
a long time before he will entertain this possibility. But why? I
believe, because so much of his previous experience in life speaks
against there being a law of nature of such a sort, and we have—so
to speak—to surmount all that experience, before embracing a
totally new way of looking at things (Wittgenstein, 1975, §234).
One might respond, of course, that even if statistical observations do
not directly inspire hypotheses, nevertheless they do amount to necessary
conditions for these hypotheses; for surely all our hypothetical laws of nature
must at least begin from statistical observation. Obviously Wittgenstein
would not deny this. However this is, in my view, a trivial point; for the
question here is one of relative stability. Our hypotheses presuppose an
enormous system of experience. We do not simply alter them with every
new statistical observation, and we only alter them if they can fit coherently
into the grand “mesh” which we use to describe the world. In other words,
while statistical observation may indeed ‘drive’ or ‘inspire’ us to hypothesise
new laws of nature, by themselves they do not constitute a sufficient basis
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for them; for the journey from ‘inspiration’ to hypothesis is typically a long
and arduous one—not a quick ad hoc procedure, as von Wright would have
us believe.
5 Conclusion
It is unfortunate that Wittgenstein did not write more on the subject of
probability. He gives us nothing like an objective measure of the degree of
confirmation for a hypothetical law of nature (i.e., just how much evidence is
required to ‘give it up’), nor does he give us anything but vague ideas as to
the amount of evidence required in order to establish these hypotheses in the
first place. Then there are the ‘pure statistical’ cases; e.g., the probability of
death of a forty year old non-smoking male. With respect to these cases, von
Wright’s account of ‘inspiration’ may be correct. But aside from an obscure
comment that “This has nothing at all to do with probability” (McGuinness,
1979, p. 94), Wittgenstein leaves us in the dark as to how these examples
are related to a logical theory of probability. This all said, Wittgenstein’s
ideas are at least not self-defeating. His definition of logical probability is
not superfluous as von Wright has asserted, nor is it irrelevant as Black has
tried to show.
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